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P2P Networks: The interplay between legislationand information tehnologySulan Wong∗ , Eitan Altman†, Mouhamad Ibrahim‡Thème COM  Systèmes ommuniantsÉquipe-Projet MaestroRapport de reherhe n° 6889  version 2§  initial version Mars 2009 revised version June 2009  30 pagesAbstrat: P2P has beome a major part of Internet tra. Along witha growing eonomi e-ommere ativity in whih onsumers purhase musi,video, software and books over the Internet, P2P le sharing networks haveenabled a free widespread publi aess to opyrighted material. A long lastingonit aompanied by an impressive arms rae has been developing betweenproduers (i.e. opyright owner ompanies) and users (part of the web surfersommunity) [46℄. In their eort to derease internet piray, ompanies havelobbied for legislation that would ban this pratie and that would inrease theirontrol and monitoring on the ontent transferred over the Internet. They havetaken legal ation against ompanies and individuals involved in P2P devel-opments, sued individual web surfers, have formed allianes with some servieproviders to prevent aess to P2P networks, and sued others that were not o-operative. Our paper desribes and analyzes dierent faets of this onit, andthe way legal ations and network tehnology interat. We summarize the roleof other ators involved and desribe other business models for the produersthat an o-exist with today's P2P networks. We then introdue mathematialmodels that study the eieny of measures to restrit piray.Key-words: Peer-to-peer networks, legislation, intelletual property, piray,mathematial models.
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Réseaux pair à pair : L'interation entre lalégislation et la tehnologie de l'informationRésumé : Le partage de hiers en pair à pair (P2P) onstitue aujourd'huiune partie importante du tra sur l'Internet. En parallèle à une roissanedes ativités de ommere en ligne où les internautes peuvent aheter musiques,vidéos, logiiels et livres, les réseaux pair à pair ont permis un aès libre etgratuit à des oeuvres protégées par le droit d'auteur. Un onit juridique delongue durée, aompagné par une impressionnante ourse à l'armement, aopposé les titulaires de droits à une large partie des internautes, utilisateurs dees réseaux [46℄. Dans leurs eorts de lutter ontre le téléhargement illégal,les titulaires de droits ont fait pression pour que la législation interdise ettepratique et permette d'aroître leur ontrle et leur surveillane sur le ontenutransféré sur Internet. Par ailleurs, ils ont engagé des ations en justie ontredes entreprises et des individus impliqués dans le développement des réseaux pairà pair. Ils ont ainsi poursuivi des internautes, formé des allianes ave ertainsfournisseurs d'aès Internet pour empêher l'aès aux réseaux pair à pair. Deplus, Ils ont poursuivi d'autres fournisseurs qui n'ont pas été oopératifs. Notreétude dérit et analyse les diérentes faettes de e onit, et la façon selonlaquelle les ations judiiaires et la tehnologie peuvent interagir. Nous résumonsle rle d'autres ateurs impliqués dans e onit puis nous dérivons plusieursmodèles éonomiques qui permettraient la o-existene entre les produ-teurs et les réseaux pair à pair d'aujourd'hui. Ensuite, nous présentons desmodèles mathématiques qui permettent d'étudier l'eaité des mesures visantà limiter le piratage.Mots-lés : Réseaux pair à pair, législation, propriété intelletuelle, piratage,modèles mathématiques.
The interplay between legislation and information tehnology 31 IntrodutionWithin the networking ommunity there has been a large amount of researhdevoted to P2P networks, to inentives for sharing information, to improve P2Pprotool eieny and to seurity related issues whih inlude ways to keeppeer anonymity. There are ertainly huge eonomi interests whih stimulatethe researh eort devoted to these networks, whih are already responsiblefor reating between 30% to 60% of the Internet tra. Yet there is littleawareness among the network ommunity of the legal aspets related to lesharing in P2P networks and of the dramati impat that this ould have onfuture developments in P2P network arhiteture. Understanding the evolutionin legislation onerning P2P users, servers and developers is entral to makingresearh in this area relevant.In ontrast to the term piray that learly assoiates downloading withriminal ativity, both legal as well as the soial pereption of le sharing are farfrom taking a lear side in this onit: legislation dramatially diers from oneplae to another and the ethis of le sharing diers from one setor to another.On the legal side, there are ountries where non-authorized downloading ofopyrighted material is illegal and where individuals involved are proseutedand ned. In other ountries, downloading opyrighted material for non-protpersonal purposes is not illegal and is even onsidered to generate benet foropyright owners [65℄. The following quote from [49℄ illustrates the dierenein the way piray is viewed: "As noted by one RIAA1 lawyer, onsumers whowould never onsider walking out of a reord store with a CD that they hadnot purhased had no ompuntions about obtaining MP3 les for free overNapster."Halting or dereasing the amount of unauthorized download requires morethan banning this ativity. It requires legal and tehnologial tools to eitherprevent aess to internet hosts of suh ontent, or to monitor P2P tra, toidentify both the illegal nature of a le transfer as well as the personal data ofthe user that initiated the transfer. These further require alliane or ooperationwith other ators: either with the servie provider (who has aess to personaldata or who an install lters) or with the equipment manufaturer (wheneverthe latter an inlude in the equipment detetion of whether aess to someontent is authorized).By taking legal ations against piray or even just by threatening to do so,suh downloads derease [10℄. How eetive would suh measures be? Oneof our main goals in this work has been to develop mathematial models thatpredit that eieny. More preisely, we examine the following questions: What is the inuene of dereasing the demand for a le by a givenamount, on its availability (i.e. on the probability to nd it in a P2Pnetwork)? What is the inuene of dereasing the demand for a le by a givenamount, on the rate of downloads of this le?Using simple mathematial models that are based on queueing theory, we showthat by dereasing the demand for a le by a given perent, its availability will1RIAA stands for Reording Industry Assoiation of Ameria whih is a trade assoiationthat represents the reording industry in the United States.RR n° 6889
4 Wong, Altman & Ibrahimonly derease slightly if it is a popular le, whereas it ould derease dramatiallyif it is not. On the other hand, the rate of number of downloads of a popularle is expeted to derease more.In view of our ndings, we ompare the urrent poliy of ontent ompanies,based on ghting against free aess to opyright material, with alternativeproposed poliies. We briey mention the advantages that ontent ompanies,servie providers and internet users ould have from a new generation of entral-ized mega-P2P networks that would be hosted by ontent or servie providersand that would allow subsribers to have unlimited aess to a large range ofontent.The struture of the paper is as follows. The rst part is devoted to abakground and a legal analysis of P2P networks: taxonomy of the variousators involved and their interests (Setion 2), the interation between them(Setion 3), the legislation and its development in various ountries (Setion 4).The seond part (Setion 5) provides the mathematial study that predits theavailability of ontent and of the expeted rate of downloads as a funtion ofsome measures of the popularity of a le. We end with a onluding setion.2 The ators and their interests: Taxonomy ofators2.1 International OrganizationsInternational institutions suh as the World Intelletual Property Organization(WIPO), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the European Union (EU),where member states jointly disuss and agree on resolutions and diretives toestablish a ommon legal framework relating to poliies aimed at protetingintelletual property.2.2 The StateFor purposes of this work, we onsider the State from the lassial separation ofpowers theory, i.e., as poliymaker (exeutive branh), as lawmaker (legislativebranh) and as justie administrator (judiiary branh).2.3 Internet subsribersWe are interested in Internet subsribers that engage in the opyrighted materialsharing/downloading ativity. From this perspetive we subdivide them into:1. First opy providers: users who reate a digital opy of a opyrightedmaterial and make it available for sharing/downloading over the Internet.Their reputation is based on the quality of the shared opy. Proud of theirwork, and to build a group of followers, they add their niknames to thename of the les they share. In BitTorrent networks, they are known asoriginal seeds.2. Peer to Peer users: users who share ontent proteted by opyright throughP2P networks. INRIA
The interplay between legislation and information tehnology 5(a) With authorization of the opyright holders.(b) Without authorization of the opyright holders.3. Download users: users who download ontent proteted by opyright.(a) Using free downloading servies.i. With authorization of the opyright holders: like the rok bandsNine Inh Nails and Radiohead, many artists now put their workson their web pages for free legal download.ii. Without authorization of the opyright holders: there are legalle hosting sites in whih users store opyrighted material forillegal download.(b) Using paid downloading servies.i. With authorization of the opyright holders: they work as digitalstores of opyrighted ontents, e.g., iTunes musi store.ii. Without authorization of the opyright holders: the same ser-vies that oer free downloads, allow paying ustomers to aessontent with improved download speed.2.4 Providers of LinksThere are websites speialized in the hosting of links to les shared in P2Pnetworks.They usually prot from advertisement.2.5 AuthorsThe author2 is the person who reates a literary, sienti or artisti work.In the ontext of our work, the authors an be in favor of allowing freelysharing/downloading their reation or they an be against it.2.6 PerformersWe nd in the International Convention for the Protetion of Performers, Pro-duers of Phonograms and Broadasting Organizations (1961) that performersare ators, singers, musiians, daners, and other persons who at, sing, deliver,delaim, play in, or otherwise perform literary or artisti works [69, Artile 3.a℄.In the Performanes and Phonograms Treaty (1996), this denition is widened,in order to inlude expressions of folklore [70, Artile 2.a℄.As with authors, performers an have either a pro sharing or against sharingstane.2From [68℄, we an infer that the author is the person who reates a prodution in the lit-erary, sienti and artisti domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression, suhas books, pamphlets and other writings; letures, addresses, sermons and other works of thesame nature; dramati or dramatio-musial works; horeographi works and entertainmentsin dumb show; musial ompositions with or without words; inematographi works to whihare assimilated works expressed by a proess analogous to inematography; works of drawing,painting, arhiteture, sulpture, engraving and lithography; photographi works to whihare assimilated works expressed by a proess analogous to photography; works of appliedart; illustrations, maps, plans, skethes and three-dimensional works relative to geography,topography, arhiteture or siene.RR n° 6889
6 Wong, Altman & Ibrahim2.7 Contents Prodution Industry (CPI)Most of the ontents available on P2P networks is ultural ontents. The om-panies that produe this ontents are entitled to related rights independent ofthat of the authors. We an nd four main ontent produer types, either infavor or against le sharing: Phonogram produers (musi). Cinematographi produers (movies). Publishers (printed materials). Broadasting produers (radio and television).Other types of ontents shared in P2P networks are software. We shall notfous on this type of ontents in this paper as it has very distint features thatare quite dierent than the ultural ontents. These inlude spei intelletualproperty laws (suh as patents), other types of onits between the relatedators (e.g. the open soure movement) and dierent types of eonomi models.2.8 Internet Servie Providers (ISPs)ISPs are ompanies that deal Internet onnetions. The P2P tra has beomea major part of the Internet, with around half the amount of tra transferred.There is thus a strategi importane for ISPs in oering aess to P2P appli-ations, to omply with their ustomers preferenes. But, pressure has beenmounting to make them the key ators in the new CPI strategy.2.9 Content Servie Providers (CSPs)CSPs provide, throughout an Internet servie, opyrighted ontents, either li-ensed3 or unliensed4 by opyright holders.2.10 MediaMass media have a big eet, or media inuene, on how their audienes thinkand behave. As members of the CPI, they tend to have an anti-sharing position.2.11 Royalty olleting soieties (RCSs)Authors, performers and produers usually form assoiations to ollet royaltiesfrom and to polie infringements to their opyrights. These organizations alsoserve as powerful lobbies that seek protetion from eah branh of the State.2.12 Multimedia equipment manufaturers (MEMs)MEMs are ompanies that manufature equipment apable of playing and opy-ing opyrighted ontents.3Like iTunes, AmazonMP3 or 7digital.4Like FastTrak, eDonkey or Gnutella. INRIA
The interplay between legislation and information tehnology 73 Interations between ators3.1 Interation between CPI and P2P users3.1.1 Confrontation strategies Lawsuit threats and legal ations: In the United States the RIAA hadled, settled, or threatened legal ations against at least 30,000 individualsine 2003 [20℄. Three Strikes Law or Graduated Response: The proposed law promot-ing the dissemination and the protetion of the reation over the Internet[31℄, that is urrently being disussed in Frane5, has been developed on amehanism of warnings and santions [45℄, whih involves the reation ofan independent administrative authority [31, Artile 2, 3℄. This meha-nism of warnings or "graduated response" follows three steps prior to theestablishment of santions. An email is rst sent to the infringer [31, Arti-le 2 L.331-24℄, as an "advie", reminding the subsriber of his monitoringduty [31, Art. 6 L.336-3℄. If the behavior does not hange, a seond warn-ing is sent via registered mail [31, Art. 2 L.331-24 2℄, for purposes of legalevidene. If the warnings are ignored, santions, ranging from suspensionof the Internet servie [31, Art 2 L.331-25℄, to an order for ontent ontrolmeasures, will be applied. Servie termination due to suspeting downloading patterns [50℄: a variantof the three strikes law without invading the privay of the subsriber. Byanalyzing downloading patterns, ISPs an identify le sharers with highertainty. To implement this strategy, ooperation with ISPs is neededthrough an agreement or legislation. Spreading fake songs, to litter and fool P2P networks: Using this strategy,Madonna has been able to share her thoughts about the subjet of P2Ple sharing with her fans [9℄. Proseution of P2P users: CPI and RCSs are lobbying riminalization ofP2P le sharing, to make the State the sole responsible entity. Litigationis an expensive business [55, 66℄, and the CPI and RCSs would like tounload that burden on the State.3.1.2 Cooperative interations Alternative ooperative interations are not impossible. Litman writes in[42℄: " Let's let everybody engage in peer-to-peer le trading, but pay forit. We have a number of pratial models for doing that, espeially inthe musi business. Composers, for example, get paid for every time themusi they wrote is performed in a lub, or broadast on TV, or deliveredby Diret TV to someone's satellite dish ...". Musi Tax: ISPs would like to see some kind of blanket liene to over alltheir users' downloads of opyrighted ontents. Users will pay a monthly5Spain, Ireland, Italy and New Zealand, in addition to Frane, are disussing similar ini-tiatives. In USA, the RIAA has reently delared that they will no longer sue, and insteadwill seek alliane with ISPs to implement the three strikes law.RR n° 6889
8 Wong, Altman & Ibrahimtax to ompensate opyright holders for their sale losses. This approahhas been proposed reently in UK6 [67℄. A reent Duth study [65℄ onludes that the benets obtained by thesavings users get when they download opyrighted material are biggerthat what the CPI loses, produing positive net eonomi eets. A similaronlusion has already been obtained in [8℄ 10 years ago: " We nd, forexample, that under ertain irumstanes sharing will markedly inreaseprot even if sharing is ineient in the sense that it is more expensivefor onsumers to distribute the goods via sharing than it would be for theproduer to simply produe additional units."For other ooperative models, see: [65, 5, 7℄.3.1.3 Other strategies: Eduative CampaignsOn November 2008, the Ministry of Culture of Spain has launhed a four monthampaign to raise awareness in the population of P2P users, alled Si ereslegal, eres legal7. In 2007 [71℄, as part of the series for kids aged 8 to 12, alledLearn from the past, reate the future, the book The arts and opyright wasdistributed. In 2008, the University of Alalá [64℄ presented the projet Eduarpara rear in assoiation with CEDRO, NBC-Universal, Telefónia, Mirosoft,MPA, Anele, BSA and Toshiba to teah kids and teenagers the problems intel-letual property is faing due to le sharing. A pilot test was launhed in fourshools of Asturias in Spain, where videos were taken depiting kids as pirateswho stole intelletual property from their legitimate owners.Strengthening enforement of intelletual property rights through eduationampaigns, is made possible by the State that atively supports the position ofCPI. It indiates that internet piray and the ght against it are beoming aentral issue in our soiety and that perhaps an ideologial hange is requiredamong Internet users if this phenomenon is to disappear. Indeed, as Smiers [55℄says, there seems to exist a form of silent resistane to follow the guidelines thatthe CPI establishes, and perhaps what is happening is that people do not obeylaws that they do not believe in [42, p. 217℄.3.2 CPI v. Authors and PerformersIn [32℄, the authors investigate whether and to what extent there is a onit ofinterest between artists and their publishers, as to whether and to what degreeillegal distributions of their opyrighted reordings should be prevented.It is natural to expet ooperation between the CPI and authors and per-formers, due to their omplementary roles. CPI need the latter to oer prod-uts. They an in turn oer all tehnial knowhow for the prodution and allthe marketing support.Potential onits may our when: Authors and performers onsider their share in the inome as being toosmall.6The Minister of Communiations has proposed a tax, of around ¿20 per year, to broadbandonnetions, as ompensation for opyrighted material download.7In English if you are legal, you are legal. Available at: http://www.siereslegalereslegal.om/portada.php INRIA
The interplay between legislation and information tehnology 9 They are faed with other restritions imposed on them onerning reuseof their material, They wish their work to be widely aessible, whereas the CPI pries (thatwould maximize their own prots) ould indue a muh smaller demand.3.3 CPI v. ISPsThere have been both alliane as well as legal lashes between the CPI and ISPs.The CPI has been able to disover illegal downloads, without the interventionof ISPs; they have been able to get the IP addresses of suh downloaders. Atthis point the CPI needs the ooperation of ISPs in order to get the personaldata that orresponds to the IP addresses. Muh more ooperation is needed inorder to ahieve eient ltering and monitoring of downloads of unauthorizedopyrighted material (see measures desribed in Subsetion 3.1).A possible strategy of the CPI to get ISPs on their side is to propose to payISPs by RCSs for eah disonnetion due to opyright infringement.3.4 CPI v. MEMsThe onsumers of equipment are users as well as servie providers, and notso muh the ontent enterprises. The relation between CPI and MEMs aretherefore expeted to be determined by what the MEMs represent for the CPI.There is a potential onit in that new tehnology developed by equipmentompanies an make it easier for users to share ontents illegally and thus toredue the benets of CPI. There is also a potential benet for ooperation as itan allow CPI to develop new business models based on speialized tehnologieswhih are less vulnerable to pirating.The CPI thus has ooperative (peaeful) and non-ooperative (aggressive)ations it an use in its relation to the MEMs.A onfrontation poliy P2P is not the rst tehnology that introdues on-troversy between equipment and leisure industry. On 1984, US Supreme Courtrejeted the movie industry's attempt to bar Sony from manufaturing videoreorders, siding in favor of the development of tehnologies that are apable ofsubstantial non-infringement uses [41, 57℄.In 1999, the DVD Copy Control Assoiation (DVD CCA) took ation to tryto prevent the distribution of software whih, if used, would enable individualsto play digital video disks (DVDs) without tehnologial restritions suh aspratial limitation odes imposed by their owners - movie proprietors [53℄.The Court of Appeal for the Sixth Appellate Distrit of the State of Californiahas ruled that defendant Andrew Bunner and numerous other defendants arenot required to refrain from the Internet publiation of suh software.A ooperative poliy Compromise based approahes an also be imaginedas we an learn from history of other onits between CPI and MEM. In theearly 1990s, the musi industry and the Digital Audio Tape industry agreedto promote ompromise legislation establishing a reimbursement sheme basedon a safe harbor for devies using a Serial Copyright Management Systemmemorialized in the Audio Home Reording At of 1991 [49℄.RR n° 6889
10 Wong, Altman & IbrahimAn example of ooperation between CPI and MEMs is illustrated in AppleiTunes store. Sine its ineption, the onmipresent iPod has been linked to DRMthat limited songs bought at Apple's iTunes, to be played only on one omputerand one iPod. In 2007, Apple teamed with EMI to sell higher quality, DRM-free songs [2℄. In January 2009, Apple ommuniated [3℄ that the remainingmajor musi labels (Sony, Universal and Warner), as well as many independentlabels, will join EMI in their DRM-free atalog. This approah ould be aviable business model that ould suessfully ompete with P2P non-authorizeddownloads.4 Legal state of non-authorized sharing of opy-righted materialEvery time the CPI faes a tehnologial development that allows the dissem-ination of ultural ontents, liensed or not by opyright owners, massive legalarmies are levied: the danger of sales drops makes for a perfet argument [34℄.Well-naned lobbies are used to push for legislative responses that protet fromany at of piray of the intelletual property of ultural works. Both yesterdayand today, new tehnologies have been presented as a threat to opyright: as-sette reorders, VCR's, CD and DVD reorders. Now is the turn of the P2Pnetworks.4.1 Developing P2P networksThe rst generation of P2P networks based on a entral server with free aessto unauthorized opyright material have now disappeared. They are onsideredillegal everywhere, see Appendix.4.2 Download and upload of non-authorized ontentWe will examine the legality of the le-sharing of opyrighted ontents throughP2P networks, based on the limits to the reprodution right of opyright holders.Both, Berne Convention [68, Art. 9.2℄ and European Diretive 2001/29/EC [26,Art. 5, 2b℄, have given to member States, power to limit the exerise of thisright. However, this power is onditioned on both texts. Maybe, the EuropeanDiretive is more expliit in regard to the issue of exeptions and limitationsto the reprodution right. These limits an be established by the EU memberStates if the reprodution is made by an individual for private use, without diretor indiret ommerial purposes and provided that there is fair ompensationto the owner of the opyright.Countries suh as Frane [30, Art. L. 122-5-2℄, Spain [38, Art. 31.2℄, Sweden[39, Art. 12℄, Netherlands [40, Art. 16b.1℄ and Norway [36, 12℄ provide, asan exeption to the reprodution right, the opy for private use. On the otherhand, USA [63, 17 107℄, UK [59, Arts. 29,30,31℄ and Canada [12, Art. 29℄ donot, but they regulate their exeptions under the dotrine of fair use and fairdealing.In this regard, it is neessary to larify that opyright infringement, mayonstitute a ivil or riminal violation. (A ivil violation is brought to justieINRIA
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hnology 11by the plaintive where as a riminal violation is perseuted by the state. Im-prisonment is only possible in riminal ases.) For a opyright infringement tobe onsidered a riminal oense, it shall onform to the elements that dene therime8. For example, under Spanish law, an at of reprodution of opyrightproteted works is onsidered a rime if it is made for prot and to the detri-ment of third parties [37, Art. 270.1℄. Even more expliitly, Cirular 1/2006of Spain's Attorney General states that anyone who puts proteted works ina web site through a server without permission of the owner of the rights ofexploitation, ould be held liable for unauthorized ommuniation, but if mon-etary ompensation is not proven, the intent of prot is not found, and theinfringer an't be proseuted [6, III. 2. )℄, but a ivil ase is possible9. Also,those who download opyrighted ontent without paying, from someone makingan unauthorized ommuniation, are just doing a private opy of the work: thisannot be onsidered riminal behavior [6, III. 2. )℄10.4.2.1 Criminal CasesChan Nai-MingIn 2005, Hong Kong ourts handed down the rst riminal onvition related toP2P networks in the world. Chan Nai-Ming [52, 28℄ was onvited for havingserved as the original seed for three movies opied from VCD's legally purhased.The onvition was upheld by the Court of Final Appeal in 2007 [17℄.Aurèlien D.In Frane, in May 2006, the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation [16℄overturned a prior deision [15℄ and forwarded the ase of Aurèlien D. to theAix-en-Provene Court of Appeals [14℄. The defendant was found guilty ofopyrighted material ounterfeit, beause, aording to the Court of Appeals, byplaing opies in a P2P network he would no longer be overed by the statutoryexeptions: for the private use of the opier and not intended for olletive use[30, Art. L. 122-5(2)℄.4.2.2 Civil CasesBMG Musi et al. v. Ceilia GonzalezIn 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Ciruit [62℄ upheldthe deision of the United States Distrit Court for the Northern Distrit ofIllinois that delared Ceilia Gonzalez liable for opyright infringement. It wasthe rst time a Court of Appeals santioned the diret liability for opyright8This is known in Latin as Nullum rimen, nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali.9In Spain, the four biggest ompanies of the entertainment industry (Warner, Universal,EMI and Sony-BMG) and Promusiae, have reently attempted a ivil ation against thedeveloper of Blubster, Piolet and Manolito, beause his tools have been designed for "illegal"le sharing, between individuals and with "lear intent of prot". Plaintis have demandedas ompensation 13 million euros and the losing of the web sites [51℄10This irular was ritiized by the International Intelletual Property Alliane (IIPA),the most powerful U.S. lobby on issues related to opyright [35℄. For them, the irular"deriminalized" P2P le-sharing, not a good sign for a ountry with one of the biggest levelsof per apita P2P le-sharing in Europe. For this reason, the IIPA reommended keepingSpain on its wath list of ountries that do not protet opyrightRR n° 6889
12 Wong, Altman & Ibrahiminfringement by users who downloaded opyrighted ontent via P2P platforms.The dotrine of fair use was rejeted in both instanes: a opy downloaded,played, and retained on one's hard drive for future use is a diret substitute for apurhased opy and without the benet of the liense fee paid to the broadaster[62, 3℄. Moreover, the Court rules that downloads from P2P networks suh asKaZaA, are an illegal ompetition for authors, who see their prots underminedby them. In addition, the Court stated that authors should deide on the bestway to make their work available.As reported in setion 3.1.1, this is not the only lawsuit the RIAA has ledagainst users of P2P networks, but it has been the only ase to reah that farinto the US justie system.4.3 On the legal status of linkingTehno Design v. BreinIn 2004, the Distrit Court of Haarlem (Netherlands) [58℄ said that Tehno De-sign, through its website zoekmp3.nl, didn't engage in illegal ativities by mak-ing available to its users links to opyrighted les. For the Court, zoekmp3.nlworked as a searh engine for hyperlinks/deeplinks, leading users to the lesontaining opyrighted material, but not hosting them, even if by liking on alink, a le ould be diretly played from the hosting site or it ould be down-loaded onto the user's omputer. The Court found that by warning its usersabout the inadmissibility of opyright infringements, Tehno Design was relievedof liability for any possible illegal behavior of its users.In 2006, The Court of Appeal of Amsterdam [66℄ reversed the deision ofthe Distrit Court, iting that Tehno Design was aware that its searh engine,in a systemati and strutural way, provided aess to opyrighted ontents.In addition, Tehno Design got most of its eonomi benets through the a-tivity zoekmp3.nl. Finally, the warnings that Tehno Design gave to its users,aording to the Court of Appeals, was insuient to disourage violations ofopyright. zoekmp3.nl users used the servie beause they were looking for away to diretly reah the les ontaining opyrighted material.4.3.1 Tono et al. v. Frank Allan Bruvik d/b/a Napster.noIn 2005, there was a deision in Norway (in the ase of Tono et al. v. FrankAllan Bruvik d/b/a Napster.no) whih determined the liability of a providerof hyperlinks to opyrighted material. This helps uploaders make opyrightedontent available without permission from their owners. Linking in itself isnot, in the eyes of the Supreme Court of Norway, a diret infringement underthis ountry's Copyright At. But uploading without permission was, and theSupreme Court onrmed the deision of the ourt of rst instane: Frank AllanBruvik was liable for having ated at least negligently [56, 8℄ by linking toopyrighted material uploaded by infringers. For the highest ourt, without thelinks provided by Napster.no (diret links to les or deep-links) the users wouldnormally not be able to nd a musi le whih was uploaded on a omputeronneted to the Internet. The appeal ourt has not paid regard to the fatthat it is rst when a link is made to a le, that the users normally an getaess to the le. Links are of vital importane for the use of the Internet [56,INRIA
The interplay between legislation and information tehnology 1322℄. This was one of the rst ases in whih a link provider was held liable foraessory opyright infringement.4.3.2 The Pirate BayIn his deree of August 1, 2008, the Preliminary Investigations Court of Bergamo[4℄ issued a preventive seizure order on the Swedish website The Pirate Bay. Theowners of this provider of links were harged with aiding and abetting, for prot,the illegal exhange of opyrighted material. The Court of Bergamo, therefore,argued that the site was the instrument for the infringement of the opyrightlaw, as it allowed for illegal le-sharing. Beause the operation of the websitemay deteriorate or extend in time the onsequenes of that rime, the Courtdeided to plae it under preventive seizure, and enjoins all ISP's established inItaly, from granting their users aess to www.thepiratebay.org, its aliases andits stati IP address.On appeal, the Court of Bergamo said that the deree adopted by the Courtof Preliminary Investigation was a sui generis personal order, as it aeted theISPs, whih had no responsibility in the rime, so that their users would nothave aess to the web site. As this measure was not established in the Italianriminal proedure, the preventive seizure of The Pirate Bay was lifted.4.3.3 SharemulaReently, the Provinial Court of Madrid (Spain) held the deision of the Exam-ining Court Nr. 4 [48℄, whih ordered the dismissal of proeedings in the rimi-nal ase initiated against sharemula.om, a provider of P2P links to opyrightedontent. As a servie provider that provides links, the ativity of sharemula.omis regulated by the Information Soiety Servies and Eletroni Commere At(July 11, 2002). The responsibility for the ontent linked to, is subjet to a-tual knowledge of its wrongfulness; without knowledge, there is no liability.Moreover, the Court held that linking does not provide a publi ommuniationunder the Spanish Criminal Code. This deision, in line with the Cirular ofthe Attorney General (setion 4.2), summarizes the Spanish dotrine that hasbeen applied in other ases and that the IIPA has openly ritiized [35, p. 9℄.4.4 The responsibility of multimedia equipment manufa-turersIn 1999, the RIAA led an ation before the United States Court of Appeals forthe Ninth Ciruit, to prevent Diamond Multimedia Systems from manufaturingand distributing its Rio, the rst portable musi player in MP3 format. TheRIAA argued that the Rio did not meet the requirements of the Audio HomeReording At (AHRA) for digital audio reording devies, as it laked the serialopy management system and royalties for manufaturing and distribution hadnot been paid. The Court found, rst, that the Rio was not a digital audioreording devie in terms of the ARHA, the les it opied were not stored ina digital reording devie; omputers "are not digital audio reording deviesbeause their 'primary purpose' is not to make digital audio opied reordings"[60, 29 ℄. Seond, the Court understood that the ommuniation establishedbetween the Rio and a omputer ould not be lassied as a "transmission"RR n° 6889
14 Wong, Altman & Ibrahimwithin the meaning of the Copyright At, whih, again, ruled out the Rio asa digital audio reording devie [60, 2123 ℄. The lawsuit was dismissed and,even though it seems a huge pro-tehnology ruling, deisions favoring the CPIon P2P ases, were based in the Rio ase.4.5 The legal status of the ISPDigital Millennium Copyright At (DMCA)In 1998, the Digital Millennium Copyright At (DMCA), omposed of ve ti-tles overing various topis on opyright, was approved in the United States ofAmeria. Title I is designed to adapt U.S. law on opyright to WIPO treaties11,giving legislative response to CPI's onerns about the risk that tehnologies de-veloped to irumvent opyright protetion systems [63, 17 1201℄, i.e., DigitalRights Management (DRM).In Title II, a series of limitations on liability relating to material online forthe providers while performing their business ativity, were desribed [63, 17512℄:1. Transitory ommuniations when an ISP ats as a onduit for a opy-righted le requested by an user.2. System ahing of a opyrighted le requested by an user, with the purposeof saving bandwidth when another request for the same le arrives.3. Storage of information on systems or networks at diretion of users.4. Linking or referring infringing material by Internet information loationtools.The measures ontained in Titles I and II of the DMCA, and studied in thissetion are found in [26, Chapter III℄ and [25, Art. 12℄, respetively.4.6 Legal aspets of measures used by CPI The proposed Frenh law [31℄ reates a series of questions relating to fun-damental rights and freedoms [27, Artiles 7, 8 and 11℄, and the possibilityof their interferene by an administrative authority12 or a private entity13.In this regard, the Commission's position on Amendment 138 [23℄ adoptedby the European Parliament in plenary vote on 09/24/2008, states that"no restrition may be imposed on the fundamental rights and freedomsof end-users, without a prior ruling by the judiial authorities, notablyin aordane with Artile 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights ofthe European Union on freedom of expression and information, save whenpubli seurity is threatened where the ruling may be subsequent" [22℄.Likewise, the European Parliament has argued that the Commission and11Copyright Treaty (1996), Art. 11, and Performanes and Phonograms Treaty (1996) Art.18.12Like HADOPI.13Like ISP.
INRIA
The interplay between legislation and information tehnology 15Member States should avoid "adopting measures oniting with ivil lib-erties and human rights and with the priniples of proportionality, ee-tiveness and dissuasiveness, suh as the interruption of Internet aess"[24, 23℄.However, some European ountries, besides Frane, are making eorts toahieve regulations based on the philosophy of graduated response. In theUnited Kingdom, the main ISP tried to negotiate a private arrangementwith the ontent industry, to ut the servie of repeat oenders, afterseveral warnings. Spain and Italy, through their respetive ministers ofulture, have praised the Frenh model.The trend seems to be global, as we an nd news from Japan, SouthKorea, Australia or the USA, about the wisdom of the graduated responsemodel.The Constitutional Counil [13℄, after the approval of the At in Parlia-ment, has rejeted the santions mehanism established in it, appealingto the priniples and values enshrined in the Delaration of the Rights ofMan and of the Citizen. The privay of ommuniations is the guaran-tee of freedom of speeh, and this in turn means the freedom of Internetaess.Aordingly, an administrative authority an not deide on the restritionof onstitutionally proteted rights and guarantees. However, the warn-ing mehanism, whih involves ltering and monitoring of the Internetonnetions is kept [29℄.A new projet, omplimentary to the HADOPI At, has been introdued inthe Senate [1℄. Oials of the HADOPI will at as a polie fore of the In-ternet, reporting intelletual property infringements to the ourts. Crim-inal justie will proseute infringers for ontrafaçon (ounterfeit), whihis punished with imprisonment and ne penalties, and if the infringer isalso the subsriber, suspension of servie an be applied as an aessorypenalty.ISPs an be ned =C 3750 for eah ase of intelletual property infringementnot reported to the HADOPI.But the rst ountry that will apply a graduated response law is notFrane, but New Zealand. The Copyright Amendment At [44℄, sheduledfor February 2009, inludes the new 92A setion, whih states that ISP'smust have poliy for terminating aounts of repeat infringers. In Belgium, the Trial Court of the Distrit of Brussels, on 29 June 2007in the ase Sabam v S.A. Tisali (Sarlet), deided that Sarlet was liablefor P2P opyright infrations by its ustomers and should nd a way toontrol those infrations. If Sarlet was not able to do so by Otober 2008,it will pay 2500 =C per day. On Otober 28, 2008 Sarlet onvined theCourt that it was impossible to stop the infrations, at least using thesolution proposed by Sabam, a software alled Audible Magi. The Courtsaid it was for the Brussels Court of Appeals to deide on tehnial andlegal issues put forward by Sarlet: an it be made legally ompulsoryfor Internet Aess Providers - suh as Sarlet - to lter ontent; unfairRR n° 6889
16 Wong, Altman & Ibrahimompetition; onsumer rights; and whether enrypting does not make anyltering tehnologies impossible [18℄.5 Mathematial model for users' behaviorConsider a peer P that searhes for some le F . We fous on a steady statephase in whih it is assumed that the probability q that a peer has the le Fwhen it onnets, remains onstant in time.We onsider two types of peers. The rst, whih we all ooperative, on-net and remain some generally distributed time in the system, during whihthey may download les and let others download from them.Free riders are those peers that remain just the time they need to downloada le. We assume that if the le is not available they immediately disonnetand try to onnet at a later time. We assume that these remain in the networka negligible amount of time so that their ontribution to the amount of sharedle available for the ommunity is negligible.Behavior of ooperative PeersAssume that ooperative peers onnet at a rate λ and that a ooperative peerremains onneted during some generally distributed time Θ with mean σ. Let
r be the probability that a ooperative user is interested in the le F , assumingit does not have it yet. We assume that onnetion time is independent onwhether the peer has F or not, nor on whether it is interested or not to have it.A dependene exists for users that wait till F is available and then download itand disonnet; but this type of behavior is, by our denition, not a ooperativeone, and thus does not onern ooperative peers.Measures against Internet pirayWe shall onsider two types of measures. The rst, onsists on disovering andtaking measures against uploads and thus targets ooperative users: if peer Presponds to a request for uploading a le, then the soure of the request reeivesthe IP address of P. This is how RIAA proeeded to obtain data onerning usersof le sharing networks [21℄. A seond approah onsists on diretly disoveringand taking measures against illegal downloads using e.g. deep paket inspetion.Denition 5.1. (i) The availability of a le F is dened as the probability thata peer that does not have the le nds it upon arrival.(ii) The popularity of a le F is the probability that a peer has the le F just be-fore onneting, i.e. the probability q. Note that the probability that a onnetedpeer has the le F may be larger than q.(iii) The probability of future opportunities is dened as the probability that apeer who does not nd the le F upon arrival, reeives it during its onnetionduration.(iv) The DownLoad Rate (DLR) of F is dened as the rate at whih peers a-quire the le F .(v) The Interested Arrival Rate (IAR) given by β := λr(1 − q) is the rate ofarrival of peers that are interested in F and do not have it when onneting.(vi) Upload arrival rate (UAR), α, is the arrival rate of ooperative peers having
F . INRIA
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hnology 17The IAR an be viewed as the rate of arrival of demand where as UAR isthe rate of arrival of oer for F. We shall see how diminishing any one of theseimpats the availability of F , as well as the download rate of ooperative users.Behavior of Free RidersA free rider probes the network at times {Si} till it nds F . The CPI's ationswill aim to derease the probing rate. Our goal is to study the impat of thison the total time that a free rider will have to spend in probing the system tillit nds F.When analyzing free riders behavior, we shall assume in subsetion 5.2 thatthere is little interest in F among those that do not have it, i.e. r is taken tobe zero. We believe that this is an interesting regime sine we shall see thatmeasures against downloads are more eient then.The reader not interested in the mathematial analysis may go diretly toSubsetion 5.4 that desribes the qualitative results that we learn from themathematial model.5.1 Mathematial analysisLet Ñ(t) be the number of onneted peers that have the le F at time t orthat are interested in having it at that time.Theorem 5.1. The number of onneted peers at any given time t has a station-ary Poisson distribution with parameter ρ = λσ, and the number of onnetedpeers hat have the le F upon arrival is Poisson distributed with parameter ρq.The distribution of Ñ(t) is Poisson with parameter (α + β)σ where α = λq and
β = λr(1 − q).Proof. The statement follows by observing that the proess that ounts thenumber of onneted peers at t has the dynamis of an M/G/∞ queue with anarrival rate λ and a servie time distributed like Θ. The seond part followsfrom similar arguments. ⋄Let G(u) be the probability that Θ ≤ u. We shall need the following.Lemma 5.1. Consider an M/G/∞ queue with arrival rate λ̂ and with servieprobability distribution G(u). Let B∗(s, λ̂) be the LST of the residual busy periodat time 0 in stationary regime (we take it to be 0 if the server is idle at thattime). We have
B∗(s, λ̂) =
λ̂
βµ(β)
p(∞)where
µ(s) = λ
∫ ∞
0
exp(−st)p(t)dt
p(t) = exp
{
−λ̂
∫ t
0
(1 − G(u))du
}
dxProof. It diretly follows from equation (1) in [11℄ that B∗(s, λ̂) is given by
lim
y→∞
λ̂
µ(s)
∫ ∞
0
exp
{
−sx − λ̂
∫ y+x
0
(1 − G(u))du
}
dx(note that the expression in [11℄ is for the forward reurrene time, whose dis-tribution is the same as the past reurrene time.) ⋄RR n° 6889
18 Wong, Altman & IbrahimTheorem 5.2. Consider a ooperative peer interested in F and that does nothave it before onneting. The availability probability is given by 1 − ζ where
ζ = B∗(βσ, α) exp(−ασ) (1)The stationary probability of future opportunities (i.e. that the peer reeives Fduring his onnetion, given that he did not reeive it upon arrival) is 1−Θ∗(λq).where Θ∗(s) is the Laplae Stieltjes Transform (LST) of Θ at point s.The download rate is given by
DLR = β(1 − ζ + ζ(1 − Θ∗(λq)).Proof. Consider the arrival proess of only those peers that just beforeonneting, do not have F but are interested in getting it. This is a Poissonproess with intensity β. The proess that desribes the number of onnetedsessions among these orresponds thus to the number of ustomers in an M/G/∞queue with arrival rate β and i.i.d. servie time distributed like Θ. Fous on
t = 0 and onsider the past busy period of those that were interested in F. Attime t = 0 there is no onneted peer with F if and only if the following twoevents our: no peer that arrived with F before this past busy period is still in thesystem when the busy period begins. The probability of this event is
exp(−ασ). No arrivals of peers with F ourred during that past busy period. Theprobability of this event is B∗(βσ, α).This implies the Theorem. ⋄Remark 5.1. An alternative derivation of ζ is as follows. The proess thatounts the number of onneted peers that have F or that are interested in F at
t has the dynamis of an M/G/∞ queue with an arrival rate α+β and a servietime distributed like Θ. Let C be the event that a peer with F is present in thesystem at time 0. C ours i there has been at least one arrival of F duringthe past busy period at time 0. Let Np be the number of arrivals in the urrentbusy period before time 0, and let Gp(z) = E[zNp ] be its probability generatingfuntion. Then
P (C|Np) = 1 −
(
β
α + β
)Npand hene
1 − ζ = P (C) = 1 − Gp
(
β
α + β
)
.Example: exponentially distributed Θ. Consider an M/M/∞ queuewith arrival rate λ̂ and servie rate of 1 unit. Dene
Qn(s, u) =
∫ 1
0
e−ux(1 − x)s−1xndx, n ≥ 0Then [47, 33℄ the Laplae Stieltjes Transform of the residual busy period atstationary regime is
B∗(s, λ̂) =
Q1(s, λ̂)
Q0(s, λ̂)
.We onlude the following: INRIA
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hnology 19Theorem 5.3. Consider the M/M/∞ queue with arrival rate λ̂ and servie rateof 1 unit. Then the availability is given by
1 − ζ = 1 −
Q1(β, α)
Q0(β, α)
exp(−α).The probability of future opportunities (PFO) is given by
PFO =
α
α + 1The download rate is given by
DLR = β
(
1 −
Q1(β, α)
Q0(β, α)
exp(−α)
1 + α
)5.2 Analysis of Free Riders' DelayAs before, the probability to nd F upon onnetion is q. We set S0 = 0 and set
τi := Si −Si−1. Let ξi be the number of the ooperative peers who have the leat time Si. Without loss of generality we an ignore ooperative peers that donot have the le. Indeed, as we shall take r = 0, they will not ontribute to theavailability of the le. Thus the arrival rate of ooperative peers is λ = α. Wethen have ρ = ασ. Let Sc be a random variable distributed as the past sojourntime of a ooperative node.Theorem 5.4. Assume that there is very little interest in F among those thatdo not have it, i.e. r is taken to be zero. Then(i) The expeted time that it takes for a free rider peer to obtain the le F isgiven by
E[S] =
∞∑
i=1
SiP (ξi > 0, ξ1 = ... = ξi−1 = 0)
=
∞∑
i=1
Si(1 − exp(−ρP (τi < Sc))
i−1∏
j=1
exp(−ρP (τj < Sc))(ii) The expeted number of samples (probes) of the peer is given by
E[N ] =
∞∑
i=1
i(1 − exp(−ρP (τi < Sc))
i−1∏
j=1
exp(−ρP (τj < Sc))Proof. The time S at whih a free rider obtains F is Sn+1 if and only if
ξi = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and ξn+1 > 0. It is stritly greater than Sn if and only if
ξi = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We note that ξk = 0 is a renewal event so that
P (S > Sn) = P (ξ0 = ξ2 = ... = ξn = 0) = P (ξ0 = 0)
n∏
i=1
P (ξi = 0|ξi−1 = 0)as well as
P (S = Sn+1) = P (ξ1 = ξ2 = ... = ξn = 0, ξn+1 > 0)
= P (ξ1 = ξ2 = ... = ξn = 0)P (ξn+1 > 0|ξn = 0).RR n° 6889
20 Wong, Altman & IbrahimIt thus sues to ompute the distribution of ξi+1 onditioned on ξi = 0. Weompute this using the following oupling argument.Reall that the ooperative peers arrive aording to a Poisson proess. Let
Tn be the arrival time of the nth ooperative peer. Let ν(i) be the index of thelast arrival of a ooperative peer before time Si. More preisely, ν(i) = k if andonly if Tk ≤ Si < Tk+1.Consider a seond titious P2P system that has arrivals of ooperative peersat times T̃n, n ≥ 0 where T̃n := Tn − Si, n > ν(i). Thus in the new systemthere are no arrivals of ooperative peers till time 0. The sojourn times Θ̃n ofooperative peers are assumed to be the same as Θn for all n > ν(i). Clearly,whenever the original network is empty at time Sn, then the number of peerswith F at time Sn+1 is the same as the number of peers with F at time τ1 inthe new network. We ompute therefore the distribution of the latter.The new network is an Mt/G/∞ queue where the arrival proess is a nonhomogeneous Poisson proess λ(t) with intensity λ(t) = 0 for t < 0 and intensity
λ(t) = λ after that. The distribution of the number of ustomers at any time tin an Mt/G/∞ queue was derived in [19℄. Speifying equation 3 in [19℄ to oursetting we onlude that it is a Poisson distribution with parameter ρP (τi < Sc).This yields (i) and (ii) after some diret algebra. ⋄As an example, assume that the sojourn time of ooperative peers is exponen-tially distributed with parameter µ. Then Sc is known also to have exponentialdistribution with parameter µ, so we obtain:Corollary 5.1. Assume that the sojourn time of ooperative peers is exponen-tially distributed with parameter µ. Then
E[S] =
∞∑
i=1
Si(1 − exp(−µτi)) exp(−µSi−1)
=
∞∑
i=1
Si[exp(−µSi−1) − exp(−µSi)]If moreover τi = τ are onstant then we get
E[S] =
τ
1 − exp(−ρ exp(−µτ))and
E[N ] =
1
1 − exp(−ρ exp(−µτ))5.3 Numerial resultsFor the ase of ooperative peers, we investigated the availability and the down-load rate as a funtion of α and β. The goal is to understand the impat of aneort by the CPI to derease the interest in a le as a funtion of its uploadarrival rate and the demand for it. The time unit is hosen suh that σ = 1.Figure 1 depits the availability probability (y-axis) as a funtion of β (x-axis) for ve values of α: 4, 2, 1, 0.5 and 0.05. β varies in the range [0.05, . . . , 8.5]with an inremental inrease of 0.5. The urves are dereasingly ordered in α:
α = 4 orresponds to the urve that dominates all the others (straight line) andINRIA
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 sale), for 5 values of α. (Left): β varies in [10−4, 101] and α ∈
{0.01, 0.1, 0.5, 1, 2}. (Right): β varies in [10−1, 101] and α ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 1, 2}.The urves are dereasingly ordered in α. σ = 1.the lowest urve orresponds to α = 0.05. Figure 2 plots the availability as afuntion of α and β on a logarithmi horizontal sale.Similarly, Figures 3 plots the download rate as a funtion of α and β.For the ase of free riders, we looked to the impat of sampling frequenyon the mean waiting time. Figure 4 plots the mean waiting time of a free riderto download a le (y-axis) as a funtion of the sampling interval τ (x-axis). Inthe left gure, λ = α = 1 is xed and µ takes three dierent values: 1, 0.5 and0.05. In the right gure, µ = 1 is xed and α takes three values 1, 0.5 and 0.05.RR n° 6889
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Figure 3: The download rate (y-axis) as a funtion of β (x-axis) for 5 values of α.(Left): β varies in [0.05, 8.5] with an inrement of 0.5 and α ∈ {0.05, 0.5, 1, 2, 4}.(Right): β varies in [10−3, 1] and α ∈ {0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.5, 1}. The urves aredereasingly ordered in α. σ = 1.5.4 On the eieny of CPI measures: Conlusions drawnfrom the gures.5.4.1 Impat on availability for ooperative peers For α large (value greater than 1), no matter how muh eort is putto disourage the download interest of peers, the le will remain highlyavailable (probability more than 0.8). Thus a huge eort that redues βfrom 8.5 to 0.05 will result in minor derease on le availability. Hene,if λqσ is around 1 or more, then the benet of trying to disourage thedownload is negligible. This onlusion remains true also if the eort is made to derease α when βis large where a derease in α will not have muh impat on the availabilityprobability. However, when both α and β are small, a derease in β will dereasedramatially the availability of the le in the network. For instane, weobserve that by reduing β from β = 1 to half its value at α = 0.05, theavailability will derease from 0.53 to 0.4, i.e. by around 30%. Here is another way to view this behavior. Dene the slope of the avail-ability urve for a xed α as the Availability Derease Rate (ADR).It indiates the derease of the availability per unit of derease in β. Weobserve that the urves in Figure 1 are all onave. This implies thatthe ADR inreases when either β or α inrease. Hene for eah α it ismaximized at β = 0. So far we observed how does a unit derease in the IAR aets the avail-ability. This onerned subtrating a unit. Next we onsider how doesINRIA
The interplay between legislation and information tehnology 23a multipliative rate redution aets the availability. The multipliativeredution is equivalent to subtrating from the IAR a unit on a logarith-mi sale. We observe this eet in Figure 2 whose horizontal axis islogarithmi. The urves are no longer onave anymore, but instead theyhave a sigmoid form. Now the largest redution of the availability due toshrinking the IAR by a multipliative onstant does no longer our any-more on the boundary but at an interior point. For instane, when α ≤ 1,dividing the rate of arrivals β by 10 has the largest impat in reduing theavailability (see Figure 2-Right).We thus onlude that if the eort of the CPI is proportional to the amountby whih it an derease the interest in a le, or more preisely, the arrivalrate β, then the largest derease in the availability for a given eort is obtainedfor ontent that has β and α as small as possible. If the eort of the CPI isproportional to the multipliative fator by whih the interest arrival rate β isredued, then the value of β for whih the derease in the availability per a giveneort is largest is in general an interior point - it is obtained at those (α, β) forwhih the slope in Figure 2 is the largest.5.4.2 Impat on download rate of ooperative peersAs for the download rate, we observe that it grows with β at a rate that is loseto onstant and almost independent of the value of α (Figure 3-Left). In fat,the linear behavior ours when the availability is large (lose to 1). There, thedownload rate is lose to β. By reduing the IAR β to some β′ in this range, thedownload rate obviously dereases by the same amount. We say that measuresfor reduing the download rate are eetive if by reduing the IAR from β to
∆β, the download rate dereases by a multipliative fator larger than ∆. Wesee that this ours again at low α and β. For instane, we observe in the rightpart of Figure 3 for α = 0.05, that when β dereases from 1 to 0.5 by a fatorof 2, the DLR dereases by a fator lose to 3.5.4.3 Impat on delays of free ridersAs an be expeted, we observe that for a given mean sojourn time of oopera-tive users, the mean waiting time of a free rider inreases with larger samplingintervals. Inversely, for a given sampling interval, the mean waiting time de-reases when the mean sojourn time inreases.This is illustrated in Figure 4. For a given λ, and as the value of µ beomeslarge (i.e. ooperative peers stay onneted for short time), a small inrease inthe probing rate τ results in a large inrease in the expeted time that the freerider has to spend probing till it nds F . The same onlusion is seen to holdwhen µ is xed and α beomes small.We onlude that if CPI an take ations that derease the probing rates offree riders, then it an aet expeted waiting time of free riders dramatiallywhen ρ = α/µ is already small, otherwise this measure does not have muhimpat.
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Figure 4: The mean waiting time for a free rider (y-axis) as a funtion ofsampling interval τ (x-axis). (Left): λ = 1 onstant and µ ∈ {0.05, 0.5, 1}.(Right): µ = 1 is onstant and λ ∈ {0.05, 0.5, 1}.6 ConlusionsThe legislative status of P2P is experiening many rapid hanges, whih mayhave impat both on its future business models as well as on its arhiteture.Through a simple mathematial model we have shown that the eorts ofreduing interest in downloading may not result in dereasing of the availabilityof les for downloading. This is in line with the onlusions drawn in [10℄ fromexperimental results reported there. Similar onlusions were drawn for thewaiting time of free riders. We have identied however ases in whih ationsfor reduing the rate of requests for a le have a large impat on the le'savailability and on the download rate.We onlude with some insight from the past on the question of whether onean expet open legal aess through P2P networks to opyright material in thefuture. In 1984, US Supreme Court rejeted the movie industry's attempt to barSony from manufaturing video reorders, siding in favor of the development oftehnologies that are apable of substantial non-infringing uses [41, 57℄. As al-ready mentioned, in the early 1990s, the musi industry and the Digital AudioTape industry agreed to promote ompromise legislation establishing a reim-bursement sheme based on a safe harbor for devies using a Serial CopyrightManagement System memorialized in the Audio Home previous term Reord-ing next term At of 1991, 17 U.S.C. 1001-1010 (2000) ("AHRA") [49℄. We mayexpet similar moves in the future towards a new P2P onept in whih someat rate is paid to opyright holders representatives for unlimited aess to P2Pnetworks that may ontain opyrighted musi and lms.Referen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h rights14. Napster was held liable by the Court of Distrit, of having de-signed, operated and made available to Internet users a system that allowed theinfringement of opyright. The Ninth Ciruit was the ground for a new battlebetween the CPI and tehnology innovators. The Court of Appeals found thatNapster users were not fair users, and that their upload and download ativ-ities infringed, at least, on two exlusive rights: the rights of reprodution,106(1); and distribution, 106(3) [61, 11℄. Moreover, AHRA's liability exemp-tion ould not be applied to Napster users, beause, as stated in the Diamondruling, a omputer's hard disk ontaining musi les was not a digital musialreording.Napster liability for ontributory infringement was onrmed by three argu-ments: rst, diret infringement by Napster users was delared; seond, Napsterdid a material ontribution to the diret infringement ommitted by its users, byproviding the servie to exhange opyrighted les15; and third, Napster by its14The Court of Appeals ruled that A&MReords et al. should notify Napster of opyrightedworks and les ontaining suh works available on the Napster system before Napster has theduty to disable aess to the oending ontent [61, 84℄.15We agree that Napster provides 'the site and failities' for diret infringement [61, 58℄RR n° 6889
30 Wong, Altman & Ibrahimondut, knowingly enourages and assists the infringement of plaintis' opy-rights [61, 49℄. Napster, was also delared a viarious opyright infringer byhaving nanial benets of these violations [61, 61℄ and by failing to ontrol16the illegal use given to its network.This deision was the turning point in the position of the Amerian Courtsabout the liability of P2P networks developers. Around 75 million people [54,p. 2℄ in Ameria were held liable for diret opyright infringement, a neessaryruling to let the CPI ght the easiest foe with the easiest argument: tehnologyindustries and their ontributory and viarious infringement.
16Conversely, Napster may be viariously liable when it fails to armatively use its abilityto patrol its system and prelude aess to potentially infringing les listed in its searh index.Napster has both the ability to use its searh funtion to identify infringing musial reordingsand the right to bar partiipation of users who engage in the transmission of infringing les[61, 85℄. INRIA
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